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INFORMAL MARRIAGES IN TENNESSEE-MARRIAGE BY ESTOPPEL,
BY PRESCRIPTION AND BY RATIFICATION
Common law marriages are still recognized as valid in slightly less than
half of the American jurisdictions.' These jurisdictions usually construe their
marriage statutes to be merely directory, rather than mandatory or exclusive
of any other means of effecting the marriage contract.2 They are not, however, in agreement as to the requisites of a common law marriage, beyond
the uniform holding that mutual consent to become husband and wife at the
time of the agreement is necessary. While some states hold such mutual
consent sufficient by itself,3 others require the consent to be followed by
4
cohabitation openly as man and wife to make valid the informal marriage.
Sexual relations between a man and woman are not alone sufficient to coistitute a common law marriage. There must be an agreement to assume the
marriage status; and, where cohabitation and repute are relied on to show
marriage, cohabitation must be as husband and wife, and not merely
meretricious. 5
Although Tennessee is always listed among those states not recognizing
common law marriage, 6 the courts of the state have frequently used other
techniques to hold parties to informal marriages to obligations normally
-incidental to statutory marriages. The present state of law in Tennessee is
not accurately described by the statement that Tennessee does not recognize
common law marriages,7 and a collection and analysis of the cases on this
subject may serve a useful purpose.
1. On the general subject of common law marriages, see: 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE ANt,
§§ 268-92 (6th ed. 1881); KEEzER, MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE §§ 20-30 (Morland
ed. 1946); KOEGEL, CoMmoN LAW MARRIAGE (1922); 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCV,
SEPARATION AND DOmESTIc RELATIONS §§ 1169-1442 (6th ed. 1921); 1 VERNIER, An.EItIcAN FA.mILy LAWS § 26 (1931) ; Black, Common Law Marriage, 2 U. oF CixN. L. REV.
113 (1928) ; Jacobs, Common Law Marriage in 4 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 56 (1937) ; Myerberg,
Common Law Marriage, 29 GEo. L. J. 858 (1941). For detailed treatment of informal
marriages in individual states, see Hall, Commonu
-Law Marriage in New York State, 30
COL. L. REv. 1 (1930); Moynahan, Common-Law Marriage in Ohio, 5 0OI ST. L.J.
26, 175 (1938-39); Pacific, Common -Law Marriage in Mississippi, 16 Miss. L.J. 40
(1943); Note, The Decline and Fall of Comion-Law Marriage in Pennsylvanla, 18
TEMP. L.Q. 264 (1944); Note, Common Law Marriage it; Tennessee, 19 TENN. L. REv.
83 (1945).
2. 1 VERxIER, AmEcA- FA-MILY LAWS § 26 (1931) ; Notes, 39 A.L.R. 538 (1925),
60 A.L.R. 541 (1929), 94 A.L.R. 1000 (1935), 133 A.L.R. 758 (1941).
3. Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N.W. 31 (1896); United States v. Simpson, 4
Utah 227, 7 Pac. 257 (1885).
4. Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 885 (1915), 14 MIcH. L. REv. 260 (1916);
Westfall v. J. P. Burroughs & Son, 280 Mich. 638, 274 N.W. 358 (1937); Griegsby v.
Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913). See Note, Necessity of Cohabitation in Colnmon Law Marriage,23 IowA L. REv. 75 (1937).
5. E.g., Edgewater Coal Co. v. Yates, 261 Ky. 335, 87 S.W.2d 596 (1935).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. "That Tennessee does not recognize common law marriages is a statement often
used, but loosely, and with little support." Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329,
332 (E.D. Tenn. 1949).
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPIENT OF THE RULE THAT COM2,1ON LAW MARRIAGES

ARE VOID IN TENNESSEE

Bashaw v. State,8 the first reported case questioning the validity of
common law or informal marriages in Tennessee, held in 1829 that the
common law on this subject had been wholly superseded by the statutes
prescribing the formalities by which the marriage contract must be entered
into ;9 and the court two years later reiterated this position, saying, "Since
the year 1741, at the least, the common law mode of constituting a legal
marriage is of no validity here." 10 But subsequently, in several decisions,
the court used language which cast serious doubts upon the soundness of
those early cases." In 1871,12 holding that a marriage between slaves with
the assent of their owners, whether contracted in common law form or
celebrated under the statute, always had been a valid marriage in Tennessee,
3
the court declared, "There is nothing in either of those statutes' which
expressly annuls or prohibits marriages in the common law form, and as
14
the common law has been adopted, also by statute, the two statutes should
have been, in our opinion, so construed as to authorize a marriage in either
mode." 15 And shortly thereafter a federal court interpreted Tennessee law
as upholding marriages of the common law type. 16 However, in 1905 the
State Supreme Court in the leading case of Smith v. North Memphis Savings
Bank 1 foreclosed further discussion on the point, holding that the earlier
rule of the Bashaw'5 and Grisham' 9 cases was controlling. The court stated
that the provisions of the statute construed in those cases had been re-enacted
by the Code of 1858, and applied the rule of construction that where a
statute has received a judicial interpretation and is thereafter re-enacted,
such interpretation forms a part of the enactment. It therefore concluded
that since the Code of 1858 the common law in this particular was abrogated
8. 9 Tenn. 177 (1829).

9. The court was not compelled to rule as broadly as it did in that case. The only
express negative in the statutes which the court referred to was the provision that all
marriages solemnized without license should be void. As a matter of fact, the marriage

under consideration was solemnized without license and was therefore expressly void

under this limited clause, and it was therefore not necessary to the decision for the court
to hold void attempted marriages not solemnized. On this point, see Note, 39 A.L.R.

538, 557 (1925).
10. Grisham v. State, 10 Tenn. 589, 592 (1831).

11. See McCorry v. King's Heirs, 22 Tenn. 267, 273 (1842); Rice v. State, 26 Tenn.
14, 15 (1846) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Tenn. 626, 630 (1860).
12. Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. 653 (1871).

13. N.C. Acts 1741, c. 1, ThxN. ComP. STAT. 449 (Car. & Nich. 1836); N.C. Acts
1778, c. 7, TENN. ComP. STAT. 450 (Car. & Nich. 1836).
14. N.C. Acts 1715, c. 31, § 6, TmNr. ComP. STAT. 437-38 (Car. & Nich. 1836);
N.C. Acts 1778, c. 5, § 2, TENN. ComP. STAT. 438 (Car. & Nich. 1836).
15. Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. "653, 667 (1871).
16. Holabird v. Atlantic Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 Fed. Cas. 315, No. 6, 587 (C.C.E.D.

Mo. 1873).
17. 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392 (1905).

18. Bashaw v. State, 9 Tenn. 177 (1829).
19. Grisham v. State, 10 Tenn. 589 (1831).
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by statute. 20 The proposition that common law marriages are void in Tennessee has never been seriously controverted since, 21 the subsequent cases
raising only the question of other means of holding the parties or their
representatives to obligations normally incidental to the marriage contract.
There has, however, been a code section enacted since that time which,
if read literally, might throw doubt on the conclusion that every attempted
marriage not contracted in conformance with the marriage statutes is void.
In its present form, it provides: "Failure to comply with the requirements of
this law, however, shall not affect the validity of any marriage consummated
by ceremony." 22 The extent to which this section applies to the statutory
20. Doubts cast by language in intervening cases were expressly nullified, and the
court further declared that if the question had been before it as one of first impression,
it would hold as had the court in the Bashaw case. Smith v. North Memphis Savings
Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 31, 89 S.W.392, 396 (1905). An interesting example of how two
courts may draw directly opposite conclusions from a statute by statutory construction
is provided by Snuffer v. Karr, 197 Mo. 182, 94 S.W. 983, 7 Ann. Cas, 780 (1906).
Apparently unaware of the Smith case, the Missouri Court construed the marriage laws
as codified in the Tennessee Code of 1858 to be merely directory, instead of mandatory
as the Tennessee Court had done just a few months before. The court reasoned: "In
our judgment the Bashaw and Grisham cases can be recognized as good law and yet
as not authority in the case at bar. One of the statutes considered in the Bashaw Case
provided: 'and all marriages solemnized as aforesaid without such license shall be, and
are, hereby declared illegal and void.' This statute was one of the potent factors in the
decisions in these two cases. At the time of the marriage involved herein, 1860, there
was no such positive declaratory statute, but only the usual directory statutes described
in the text from Encyclopedia of Law. [19 CYc. 1195] So that the court might properly
hold at the one time, with this express statute, that no common law marriage could be
recognized, but would be unwarranted to so hold under the statutes in force at the
date of this marriage, which was Code Tenn. 1858 (Meigs & Cooper), §§ 2436-2447.
There are no words of nullification in these sections. . . . [T]he general rule . . . is
that, unless there is an express nullifying statute, common-law marriages are valid.
We find no civil case, even in Tennessee, where this doctrine had not received recognition." 94 S.W. at 987.
21. This is not to say that the courts of Tennessee will not recognize as valil a
marriage of the common law mode entered into in a jurisdiction where such marriage
is legally sufficient. So when a man and woman were married in territory held by the
Cherokee nation within the boundaries of the State of Tennessee where all that was
necessary by their usages was a public agreement to live together as man and wife. it
was found that the woman was a feme covert having no right to sue. "Our courts of
justice recognize as valid all marriages of a foreign country; and there is no reason
why a marriage made and consummated in an Indian nation should be subject to a
different rule of action." Morgan v. McGhee, 24 Tenn. 13, 14 (1844).
This proposition was reaffirmed recently in an opinion handed down by a federal
district court in Tennessee. That court said: "The marriage, having been consummated
as a common law marriage in Alabama, became a vali'd and subsisting marriage also
as to all other states and so continued until the insured's death [citing Morgan v. McGhee, supra; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W.305, 2 L.R.A. 703, 10 Am. St.
Rep. 648 (1889) ; Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618, 159 A.L.R. 101 (1945) ;
Smith v. Mitchell, 185 Tenn. 57, 202 S.V.2d 979 (1947)]. In Pennegar v. State the
court stated the general rule to be that, unless some positive statute or pronounced
public policy demands otherwise. 'a marriage, valid where solemnized, is valid everywhere.' Tennessee has placed two situations within the exception to the general rule.
One is where the out-of-state marriage contravenes Tennessee's statute against marriage
to the correspondent by a party divorced for adultery. Pennegar v. State, supra. The
other is where parties, though validly married in another state, could not lawfully
have been married in Tennessee because of this state's miscegnation statute. State v.
Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549 (1872)." Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp.
329 at 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1949), 21 TENN. L. REv. 197.
22. Tenn. Acts 1937, c. 81, § 6, TENx. CoDE Ai'. § 8414.6 (Williams, Supp. 1948)
[superseding § 8419 (Williams 1934)].

NOTES

1950]

requirements for marriage is not entirely clear, inasmuch as the words "this
law" may. apply only to those sections added with it in 1937,23 or they may
also apply to other sections preceding it in the article on Marriage in the
Code. 24 There is, unfortunately, no clear judicial interpretation in this regard,
the section being considered in only one reported decision, and there very
shortly and inconclusively.

25

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMIENT OF OTHER TECHNIQUES FOR HOLDING
PARTIEs BOUND RY INFORMAL MARRIAGES

A. Reputation and Presumptions
During the period of uncertainty as to the status of common law marriages in Tennessee, there was being laid a foundation in evidentiary rules
for a technique which the court could later use to avoid some of the harsh
results consequent to nonrecognition of informal marriages in certain cases.
As early as 1834, or five years after Bashaw v. State, upon an indictment for
incest, the court ruled that the relationship of the parties could be proved by
reputation, stating that "Cohabitation as man and wife and general reputation,
are evidence of marriage as well as relationship." 26 Again in 1844, the court
held that a marriage may be presumed from proof of paternity established
§§ 8414.1-8414.5 (Williams, Supp. 1948).
§§ 8408-8414 (Williams 1934). Section 8414.6 had its birth
as section 5 of chapter 6 of the Public, Acts of Tennessee, 1929. It then read: "Be it
23.
24.

TENN. CODE ANN.
TENN. CODE ANN.

further enacted, that failure to comply with requirements of this Act shall not affect

the validity of any such marriage." [Emphasis supplied]. Apparently in its enactment,
the section was intended to apply only to those sections preceding it in this chapter.
It was not until that chapter was later codified, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8415-8419
(Williams 1934), when section 5 became § 8419, that it was modified to read "this
law" instead of "this Act." While it may be possible to interpret this change of wording
as extending the application of the-section to other requirements of the marriage laws
in the Code beyond those embodied in the 1929 Act (§§ 8415-18 as codified), even more
significant is what happened in 1935. That year the Tennessee General Assembly repealed
§§ 8415-18 by chapter 116, section 1 of the Public Acts of Tennessee, 1935, but left
§ 8419 untouched. At that stage, the words, "this law," in § 8419 must have referred
to at least part of the requirements set forth in the article on marriage, §§ 8408-14; or,
else, the General Assembly, in leaving it alone of the sections originally enacted with
it, left it to have no meaning or application whatsoever, a useless thing. It was in this
position that § 8419 remained until 1937, when chapter 81 of the Public Acts of Tennessee, 1947, TENN. CODE ANN. § 8414.1-8414.6, was enacted. Section 6 of that Chapter
(§ 8414.6) superseded § 8419 without change of wording. The problem is: Does § 8414.6
now have as extensive coverage as § 8419 may have had, or does it merely apply to
the requirements brought into existence by chapter 81 (§§ 8414.1-8414.5)?
25. Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618 (1945). Speaking of section
8414.6, the court said: "Section 6 . . . removes the statute from that class of statutes
which render void a marriage contracted between whites and negroes and between a
defendant divorced for adultery and his paramour. Statutes such as the latter, as said
in Pennegar v. State, supra [87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305 (1889)], are 'passed in pursuance of a determined public policy of the state, in the interest of public morals.' See
also Jennings v. Jennitgs, supra [165 Tenn. 295, 54 S.W.2d 961 (1932)]. Evidently
the legislature thought that public morals would be better subserved by recognizing
the validity of a marriage consummated by ceremony even though it was contracted in
violation of the provisions of Chapter 81 of the Public Acts of 1937." Id. at 423, 424,
187 S.W2d at 619.
26. Ewell v. State, 14 Tenn. 364, 372 (1834). See also, Flowers v. Haralson, 14
Tenn. 494 (1834); Swink v. French, 79 Tenn. 78 (1883).
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by reputation in a civil action, especially where the question arises incidentally,
and not between persons claiming under conflicting rights of heirship.27 Citing
these cases, the court could later say in Johnson v. Johnson,28 "It is a familiar
doctrine that in all cases, except prosecutions for bigamy and actions for
criminal conversation, a marriage may be presumed, or established by reputation after a lapse of many years." 29 "Upon established principles and
analogies of the law, we think it may be held that under the circumstances
of this case a lawful marriage for all civil purposes will be conclusively presunted, and that neither the parties themselves, nor third persons perhaps,
will be heard to disprove or deny the marriage. .

.

. [I]n addition to the

presumption of a subsequent legal marriage, the parties and all other persons
are positively concluded after so great a lapse of time, from going behind the
license to question the legality of the marriage, and that, at least for all civil
purposes, the legality of the marriage must be conclusively taken to have
been a lawful one." 30

B. Marriage by Estoppel
Johnson v. Johnson 31 was the first of the Tennessee cases to hold that
the doctrine of estoppel may be used to hold parties to an informal marriage
to obligations normally incidental to statutory marriages. There the ceremonies were said before the license was procured, the parties and the clergyman believing that it would do just as well to obtain the license later and
that it was a valid marriage from the beginning. After 25 years of cohabitation as man and wife, the wife sought to have the marriage declared void and
27. Rogers v. Lessees of Park, 23 Tenn. 480 (1844).
28. 41 Tenn. 626 (1860);
29. Id. at 631. See cases cited notes 57, 58 infra. A related presumption is sometimes raised that a marriage regularly solemnized is valid (those asserting the invalidity
of it having the burden of proof), and the presumption remains though it is alleged
that the marriage was entered into pending a valid prior marriage. If the former spouse
be living, it will be presumed, in cases involving the settlement of property rights, that
one or the other party to the former marriage had procured a divorce before the second
marriage was entered into. Gamble v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S.W. 499 (1911);
Hall v. Hall, 13 Tenn. App. 683 (W.S. 1931). The presumption of divorce is one of
fact, however, and may be rebutted by proof to the contrary, though the effect is to
show the bigamous nature of the second marriage. Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219
S.W. 4 (1919).
30. 41 Tenn. 626, 631, 634 (italics added). But see Jarnigan v. Jarnigan, 80 Tenn.
292, 293, 294 (1883), where the court said, "The commissioners . . . hold as their view
of the law, that in a case like the present, where the widow claims dower as the wife
of the husband while living, and resulted as such wife to dower on his decease, that
parties having held themselves out to the world as husband and wife will be presumed
in law to have been married, after cohabitation. For this they cite Johnson v. Johnson....
[T]he case cited is not authority for the conclusion reached by the commission, in a
case of dower, where the right depends on the fact that complainant was the wife of
deceased, and the question of her being the wife or lawfully married to the deceased
is put in issue. On such an issue the marriage would have to be proven, and while
reputation and cohabitation together with the conduct of the parties might, in some
aspects of the question, be competent to show the fact, the law would not conclusively
presume the fact from such circumstances."
31. 41 Tenn. 626 (1860).
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property she had owned before marriage restored to her on the ground that
she had just discovered it was not according to statute. The court said:
"[W] hether the complainant shall be held to be estopped to deny the validity
of the marriage or otherwise, the result must be the same as respects the
present bill. In neither view can it be maintained." 32 The court said that
estoppel as applied here is based upon principles of morality, as well as of
public policy, and continued, "Whether or not such persons can acquire rights
as against others, it is clear that others may acquire rights against them....
And if they are estopped as to third persons, why shall they not, as against
each other in all civil cases, be precluded from gainsaying the marriage? Do
not the same reasons of morality and public policy apply in the one case as
in the other? And more especially should they be held to be- estopped as
between themselves when either is seeking to disturb or defeat rights which
may have been acquired by the other, either directly or indirectly, on the
faith of the marriage." 33
In perhaps the most widely known of the cases on the doctrine, Smith v.
North Memphis Savings Bank34 the Supreme Court of Tennessee considerably extended the scope of application of estoppel to informal marriage
relationships, inasmuch as the facts of that case showed no attempted compliance with the statutory requirements for marriage. The parties without
license or ceremony simply agreed to live together as man and wife. Nor did
it appear that either thought, or was led to believe, that a marriage according
to the law had been contracted. For approximately 25 years they lived and
cohabited together as married people and were so recognized and treated by
the public at large, no one else knowing of the lack of formalities in the
beginning. At the death of the husband, the wife sued the administrator
(who admitted he knew of no next of kin), claiming as widow and sole
distributee of the intestate. The court allowed recovery on the authority of
the Johnson case, 35 saying that since the husband if alive would be estopped
to deny his liability for any contracts which the complainant might have
made which would have bound a husband in lawful marriage (such as for
necessaries), and also in any proceeding begun by her to enforce a right
claimed in virtue of the reputed marital relationship,3 6 his personal representative was likewise estopped to controvert the rights of the complainant
as widow and distributee of the decedent.
32. Id. at 630.

33. Id. at 632. But see Jarnigan v. Jarnigan supra note 30.
34. 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392 (1905).
35. "We think that the case at bar is on all fours with that of Johnson v. Johnson. . . ." Id. at 36, 89 S.W. at 397. The cases are not on all fours, as the court in the
later case of Rambeau v. Farris, 186 Tenn. 503, 212 S.W.2d 359 (1948), pointed out,
inasmuch as in the Johnson case the parties went through a ceremony and in good

faith believed they were married according to law, but the parties in the Smith case
made no attempt to comply with the statute.
36. Compare this portion of the opinion with the language used in Jarnigan v.
Jarnigan, supra note 30.
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C. Marriage by Ratification

The Tennessee courts seemingly stand ready to use another device,
usually applied only by courts recognizing common law marriages, on occasion,
to avoid the harsh results consequential to nonrecognition.
It appears to be the general rule in those states permitting common law
marriages, that a new agreement to live together as man and wife after the
removal of an impediment 37 to a valid ceremonial marriage constitutes a valid
common law marriage. 38 And where both parties were innocent when they
married, either ceremonially or' by agreement, and continue to cohabit after
the unknown impediment is removed, most of these states by presumption
give their continuing intention the legal effect of a new agreement and
validate the relationship from the time of removal ;39 and some of them reach
this result in cases where there was an impediment known to one of the
parties but unknown to the other. 40 Implicit in some of the texts is the idea
that such marriage by agreement or cohabitation following the removal is
limited to states recognizing common law marriage. 41 But one text writer
says that "in a few jurisdictions marriages under such circumstances are
recognized, although common law marriages as such are invalid." 42
The Tennessee decisions relating to this point indicate that Tennessee
is' among this latter group. It has been recognized, in accordance with the
general rule, that a voidable marriage can be confirmed. 43 And when a man
and woman married according to the ,form established by usage for slaves
before emancipation, and after that proclamation mutually acknowledged each
other as husband and wife, they were held to have been lawfully married
from the time at which their subsequent living together commenced. 44 More
recently, in a proceeding to recover workmen's compensation benefits, it appeared that the woman claiming as widow of deceased had discovered after
their marriage that deceased had never obtained a divorce from his first
37. KOEGEL, Coaraiox LAW MARRIAGE 153-60 (1922); MADDEN, PERSONS AND
DoMEsTIc RELATIO.5 S 73-74 (1931); Note, Common-Law Marriage After Removal of
Impediment to Valid Ceremonial Marriage, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 513 (1927); Note, Presumption of Consent After Removal of Impediment to Validity, 39 HARv. L. RFv. 901

(1926);, Note, Marriage---"Contintnig Consent"--Creating Common Law Marriage
After Removal of Disability Due to Restrictions After Divorce, 14 VA. L, Rrv. 121
(1927); Note, 95 A.L.R. 1292 (1935).
38. E.g., Schaffer v. Krestovnikow, 89 N.J. Eq. 549, 105 Atd. 239 (1918).
39. E.g., Schuchart v. Schuchart, 61 Kan. 597, 60 Pac. 311 (1900); Davis v.
Whitlock, 90 S.C. 203, 73 S.E. 171 (1911) ; Holgate v. United Electric Ry., 47 R.I. 337.
133 AtI. 243 (1926).
40. The courts are distinctly at variance as to this latter situation. See cases cited
in 29 MicH. L. RFv. 518 (1931) and 21 VA. L. REv. 331 (1935).
41. MADDEN, PRsoNS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS 73 (1931). See also Note, 14
VA. L. REv. 120 (1927).
42. Kowh, ComloN LAW MARRAGE 153 (1922).
43. Cole v. Cole, 37 Tenn. 57 (1857) (marriage of a lunatic, cohabitation after
mind restored); .Vrarwick v. Cooper, 37 Tenn. 659 (1858) (parties to marriage below
age of consent to marry, agreement to continue relationship after attaining age) ; Jordon

v. Manning, 2 Tenn. C.C.A. 130 (1911) (same).
44. McReynolds v. State, 45 Tenn. 18 (1867).
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wife, and thereupon the claimant prevailed upon him to procure the'divorce.
The court held she had been his lawful wife, for these purposes, from the
time of the divorce without any necessity for a formal remarriage. 45 Although
this latter case does not clearly hold the marriage was a binding one as
between the parties to it, there is at least a suggestion to this effect, 46 the
court citing in support of its conclusion one of the leading cases on the doctrine of marriage by agreement following the removal of an impediment to
47
a valid ceremonial marriage.
PRESENT STATE OF THE AUTHORITIES

Since its original development, the doctrine of estoppel has been invoked
in cases arising in various ways. In Douglas v. Douglas4" the court of appeals
held that the decedent who had lived with a woman as his wife during the
five years preceding his death would have been estopped to deny the validity
of the marriage on the ground that they were married in a county other than
where the license was issued, and his heirs were estopped in that action to
question the legality of their father's marriage with the woman.4 9 In Allen v.
Allen, 50 a suit to recover for maintenance of a child, the appeals court likewise
held the husband and his administrator ad litem estopped as to the plaintiff
to deny the validity of the marriage and the legitimacy of the child following
cohabitation as man and wife and a holding out as such to the public over
a period of twelve years. Est9ppel was applied in a more recent case by the
supreme court 5 1 in a prosecution of a husband for nonsupport, the court
45. Perry v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 191 S.W2d 181 (1945). A Michigan
court earlier in the.year, in deciding that a marriage relationship entered into in Ten-

nessee while there was an existing impediment was valid under Michigan law after
the removal of the impediment, cited Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Tenn. 626 (1860), as
indicating this may also be the rule in Tennessee. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 310
Mich. 605, 17 N.W.2d 770, 773 (1945).
46. A federal court sitting in Tennessee, in a recent case calling for analysis of
the Tennessee law concerning informal marriages, had this to say of the Perry case:
"The court in the Perry case did not find it necessary to hold-that the marriage in
that case had been cured of its bigamous character by dissolution of the prior marriage
and continued cohabitation of the parties under the second, but the conclusion seems
inescapable that had the issue been directly presented the court would have so held."
Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329, 334 (E.D. Tenn. 1949). The federal case
there involved a soldier whose ceremonial marriage to W-2 in Georgia was defective
because his California divorce from W-1 was not final. After finality of that divorce,
he and W-2 lived and cohabited together as husband and wife in Alabama. Though held
to be a valid marriage in Tennessee because a valid common law marriage in Alabama,
it was clear the court thought Tennessee would have recognized validity any how under
the circumstances.
47. Perry v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 146-47, 191 S.W2d 181, 183 (1945),
citing Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68 N.J. Eq. 736, 62 At. 680 (1905), affirming 64
N.J. Eq. 414, 59 Atl. 813 (1905).
48. 6 Tenn. App. 12 (W.S. 1927).
49. This case is somewhat weakened for these purposes as the court also applied
judicial estoppel, the same heirs in an earlier suit for partition having admitted the
woman was their father's wife.
50. 8 Tenn. App. 48 (W.S. 1928).
51. Hale v. State, 179 Tenn. 201, 164 S.W.2d 822 (1942).
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saying the defendant was in no position to assert that he and prosecutrix were
never legally married after holding her out as his wife and cohabiting with
her for twelve years, and observed that one may be estopped in a criminal
52
case as well as in a civil proceeding.
In another class of cases, where the elements of living and cohabiting
together over a period of years as husband and wife and a holding out to the
public as such were shown, the supreme court has consistently allowed the
widow to recover against the employer of the deceased husband under the
workmen's compensation laws of the state, utilizing both presumptions and
estoppel to nullify the employer's attempt to disqualify her as a lawful claimant
on the grounds of an informal marriage. 53 Later cases distinguish the holdings
in the workmen's compensation cases by saying the controlling consideration
in those cases is dependency rather than relationship, in view of the purpose
of the law to relieve society by placing on industry the burden of caring for
4
its injured workmen and the dependents of deceased workmen.
On the other hand the courts have refused to apply the doctrine of
estoppel in several instances. It was held not to apply to a situation where
the party invoking it had married deceased and, after later finding out that
there was a valid subsisting marriage with another woman, continued to
live with him until his death. 55 And where a man had been divorced because
of adultery and then he married the woman with whom the adultery had been
committed, the court of appeals held that although the parties lived together
as man and wife and such woman was held out to be his wife, the parties
would not be.estopped to deny the validity of the marriage or the legitimacy
of their children, since a marriage under those circumstances is void, being
prohibited by statute. 56 It was also held in the latter case that a marriage
would not be presumed because "there can be no presumption of marriage
where such marriage is prohibited by law." 67
But, of course, this is not to say that the presumption of marriage has
52. Id. at 205, 164 S.W.2d at 823, citing State v. O'Brien, 94 Tenn. 79, 28 S.W.

311 (1894).

53. Perry v. Sun Coal Co., 183 Tenn. 141, 191 S.W.2d 181 (1945); Kinnard v.
Tennessee Chemical Co., 157 Tenn. 206, 7 S.W.2d 807 (1928); Bohlen-Huse Coal &
Ice Co. v. McDaniel, 148 Tenn. 628, 257 S.W. 848 (1924).
54. Rambeau v. Farris, 186 Tenn. 503, 212 S.W.2d 359 (1948); Sanders v. Altmeyer, 58 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Tenn. 1944).
55. Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219 S.W. 4 (1919).
56. Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148 (M.S. 1936).
57. Id. at 527, 101 S.W.2d at 150. This was in keeping with the opinion in Moore
v. Moore, 102 Tenn. 148, 152, 153, 52 S.W. 778, 780 (1899), where the Tennessee
Supreme Court had said: "And there is no doubt, if there had been no proof of the
previous legal marriage of complainant and the defendant, that, as an independent
fact, the evidence . . . would be ample upon which to rest a presumption of marriage
between Mrs. Moore and Edwards. But will such evidence be sufficient where there
is existing all the time a previous legal marriage? We think certainly not. . . . The
indulgence of the presumption in the face of the fact of her previous and still subsisting
marriage to complainant would be to make her guilty of the crime of bigamy. In such
a case there is no ground for a presumption of marriage; the second or last relation
is simply illicit and nothing more."
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lost its force in Tennessee, the quoted statement being simply a limited
exception. Just how limited was strikingly shown by the supreme court the
very next year in deciding the case of Cole v. Parton.58 The facts were: H
was divorced by WV-1 on .the sole ground of desertion. H then married W-2
and lived with her some 30 years before his death. Children by the former
marriage sought to have property, conveyed to H and W-2 as tenants by the
entireties, decreed by the court to them on the ground that H and W-2 were
living in adultery both before and after UW-ls divorce from H and that therefore the marriage between H and WV-2 was void. The court held that the
legislature in prohibiting a defendant from marrying the person with whom
he had committed adultery, had in mind a case where a divorce had been
decreed on account of the adultery of the defendant. The court then said,
"[T] he legislature in prohibiting a defendant from marrying the person with
whom he had committed adultery . . . never contemplated . . . that thirty

years after a marriage, the birth of children, the acquisition of property, and
the death of parties and witnesses, interested parties could attack that marriage, have it declared void, and the issue thereof decreed illegitimate. Such
an interpretation would likely subject many marriages to corrupt and fraudulent attacks by unscrupulous and designing persons, and would tend to make
the legal status of marriage uncertain, while the policy of the law is to protect
marriage with every presumption of legality. This is essential for the preservation and well being of society." 59 The general rule remains, as it was
succinctly stated in the Allen6" case: "Except in bigamy and criminal conversation a marriage may be presumed from cohabitation and reputation....
When it is sought to charge them with civil liability growing out of the
relation of marriage, cohabitation and the assumption of the relation of
husband and wife, and holding themselves out to the public as such, will
constitute a conclusive presumption of such relation." 61
In a comparatively recent case a federal district court sitting in'Tennessee
was confronted with an interesting situation calling for an interpretation of
Tennessee law on informal marriages. 62 The facts were these: H and W-1
lived together for ten years under conditions which would have constituted
marriage at common law, and then separated. Subsequently, H entered a
marriage with W-2 fully complying with the Tennessee statutes; and, though
they became separated before H's death, they were not divorced. The Social
Security Board settled with W-1 as the surviving widow. W-2 then sued
the Board contending that she was the surviving widow. The Board defended by saying H and W-1 created a marriage by estoppel having the civil
58. 172 Tenn. 8, 108 S.W.2d 884 (1937).
59. Id. at 11, 12, 108 S.W.2d at 885.

60. Allen v. Allen, 8 Tenn. App. 48 (W.S. 1928).

61. Id. at 50.

62. Sanders v. Altmeyer, 58 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Tenn. 1944).
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effects and legal incidents of a lawful marriage under the laws of Tennessee. 63
The court granted judgment for the plaintiff, W-2. Since common law marriages are void in Tennessee, the term "wife" used in the Tennessee statutes
of devolution 64 was held to refer only to one who is a lawfully wedded wife
or one who has married in accordance with the state's statutory requirements.
The Tennessee cases applying the doctrine of estoppel were noted, the court
saying they were correctly decided but not applicable to the case at bar.
"Common law marriages were recognized in some of these cases under their
peculiar facts and under the doctrine of estoppel in order that the purpose
of the compensation law would not be defeated, especially where the marital
status of the parties was incidental to the main question and was not directly
involved in a contest between heirs over the property." 65
Two years ago the Supreme Court of Tennessee in deciding Rambeau
6
v. Farris
" handed down an opinion which apparently places important limitations upon the application of estoppel in cases involving informal marriages.
There a man and woman were alleged to have agreed to become husband
and wife and lived together for nearly seven years until his death. However,
during the same time the man maintained a bedroom in another part of town
which he occupied occasionally, and among his friends in that neighborhood
he had the reputation of a single man, having at times told them he was a
bachelor. At his death, the woman petitioned to be declared the de facto
widow, and, relying on Johnson v. Johnson and Smith v. Bank, claimed that
a marriage between her and the deceased should be conclusively presumed.
The court held that the petition was rightly denied below, saying that the
facts of the case did not come within the rule of the cited cases, for in all
those cases, except Smith v. Bank, there was an attempted compliance with
the statutory requirements, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine having
in each case believed in the validity of the marriage and evidenced that belief
by cohabitation. The court also pointed out that the facts in the case before
it failed to show any representation made by the deceased upon which petitioner relied, but to the contrary that both parties fully understood the illicit
character of their relationship. The court concluded the opinion by saying
it was not disposed to extend the holding in Smith v. Bank.6 7 Actually the
material facts of Smith v. Bank and Farrisv. Rambeau are much alike, except
that in the latter case the deceased was believed to be a single man by certain
acquaintances in another part of town and the period of cohabitation was
63. The Social Security Act sets out that the state laws of devolution relating to
personal property in the state where the insured was domiciled when he died controls
in determining whether an applicant for benefits under the Act is the surviving widow

53 STAT. 1377, 1378 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 409(j), (m) (1940).
64. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8389 (Williams 1934).

65. Sanders v. Altm~yer, 58 F. Supp. 67, 69 (W.D. Tenn. 1944).

66. 186 Tenn. 503, 212 S.W.2d 359 (1948), 20 TENN. L. REv. 621 (1948).
67. Id. at 508, 212 S.W.2d at 361.
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cut short by death at seven years, whereas in the former case it was not
shown that anybody besides the parties themselves knew, of the lack of formalities in the beginning and the relationship -continued for 25 years. However, neither of these differences in fact was emphasized. The factors upon
which the court based its refusal to apply the doctrine-the lack of compliance
with statutory requirements, full knowledge from ,the beginning by the party
seeking to invoke the doctrine, and a lack of representation by the other
party of the validity of the marriage-were likewise present in Smith v. Bank.
This has led one commentator to the conclusion that the court in the future
probably would not apply the doctrine in a case with facts like Smith v. Bank,
but will now require as a prerequisite to its application a good faith attempt
to comply with the marriage statutes, or else belief and reliance by the party
seeking to invoke the doctrine upon a representation by the other that they
68
were validly married.
CRITICAL ANALYSIs

OF THE TENNESSEE TECHNIQUE

Estoppel has been defined as a bar or impediment raised by law which
precludes a man from alleging or from denying a certain fact or state of
facts, in consequence of his previous allegations or denial or conduct or
admission.6 9 "Equitable estoppel" or "estoppel in pais," is raised when one,
knowing the true facts of a situation, falsely represents by word of mouth,
conduct or silent acquiescence that the facts are otherwise to a person who
is ignorant of the truth of the matter, with the intention that the latter should
act upon it, and with the result that he is actually induced to act upon it,
so that if the party making the representation were not estopped to deny its
truth, the party relying thereon would be subjected to loss or injury.70
From the foregoing definition of estoppel, it is manifest that some of the
Tennessee cases considered herein to which "estoppel" was applied were not,
strictly speaking, apt situations for the application of true estoppel. The two
leading cases will suffice as examples. In Johnson v. Johnson,71 though the
man involved represented that the marriage would be just as valid if the
license were procured after the ceremony, as before, when as a matter of
law that statement was not true, and the woman acted in reliance thereon,
he made the representation in good faith, believing it to be true. Smith v.
BankL_ 72 met even fewer of the requirements, in that it was not shown that
either party there thought, or was led to believe by representations of the
68. 20 TENN. L. REV. 621 (1948).
69. BLACK, LAw DICTIONAflY 687 (3d ed. 1933).
70. Id. at 688-89. For other definitions of estoppel and equitable estoppel, see 15
WORDS AND PHRASEs 266 et seq. (Perm. ed. 1940) ; BIGELOW, LAW OF EsTOppmL 489, 60203 (6th ed., Carter 1913).
71. 41 Tenn. 626 (1860).
72. Smith v. North Memphis Savings Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 89 S.W. 392 (1905).
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other, that their agreement to live together as man and wife was a marriage
according to law. Yet the doctrine was applied in both instances. Apparently
the early Tennessee courts in developing the idea of marriage by estoppel
were not so much concerned with whether their brand of estoppel exactly
paralleled the conventional equitable estoppel point by point, as they were
in evolving a means which the court could use to give effect to the general
73
public policy in favor of upholding marriages instead of overturning them,
and to alleviate in meritorious cases the harsh consequences which would result
from an automatic or mechanical application of the old nonrecognition rule.
However, it was not to be supposed that the Tennessee courts in developing
this useful escape device was going to let the nonrecognition rule be swallowed
up by exceptions, because there was, and is, a sound public policy behind that
rule, too-that of not condoning or tolerating relationships entered into in
complete disregard for the moral and legal rules society has formulated for
establishing the marriage status. This latter policy was the one given effect
in the Rambeau case, it being clear from the opinion that neither the probate
court nor the appellate court was favorably impressed with the motives of
the participants or the character of the relationship they maintained. 74 Besides
73. As the Johnson case expressed it, the question is "one in which not only the
parties but the public also have a deep interest, in view of the consequences, as affecting
the status of children born of the marriage, the relations of affinity and consanguinity
which may have sprung from it; the rights of property which may have been acquired
on the faith of it, and all the consequential rights, obligations, and duties growing out
of it." Johnson v. Johnson, 41 Tenn. 626, 631 (1860). See also Cole v. Parton, 172
Tenn. 8, 108 S.W.2d 884 (1937); Gamble v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S.W. 499
(1911); Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 159 S.W.2d 834 (E.S. 1941); Hall v.
Hall, 13 Tenn. App. 683 (W.S. 1931). "The public policy of Tennessee and, this court
believes, the public policy of the civilized world, is to sustain marriages, not to upset
them." Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329, 332 (E.D. Tenn. 1949).
74. Said the probate court: "Relationships of this kind are immoral and against
public policy, and I don't think the court should undertake to broaden the rule for the
benefit of any person who is a party to a relationship of that kind." Rambeau v. Farris,
186 Tenn. 503, 507-08, 212 S.W.2d 359, 361 (1948). And the Supreme Court added,
"It was simply an illicit relationship carried on with the full and mutual understanding
of the parties." Id. at 508, 212 S.W.2d at 361.
An infrequently cited case in the Court of Civil Appeals, had earlier presaged
the decision in the Rambeau case with language strikingly of the same tone. That
language is now worthy of review. "But we have reached the conclusion that appellant
is not in position to invoke the doctrine of estoppel and that the chancellor was not in
error in repelling her. We are of this opinion notwithstanding the very cogent language
of Sinith v. Bank, supra, bottomed as it is in the early case of Johnson ',.Johnson,
1 Cold. 626. We can readily conceive of cases where the survivor of an alleged marriage
can insist that the heirs of the other be restrained from disputing the validity of the
arrangement, just as neither party can deny the marriage during their joint lives ...
iT]he doctrine of estoppel . . . is available to shield the innocent . . . and to protect
the unwary from the designs or conduct of others. It can ever [sic] be made available
for the wiicked, the wise or designing. We are of the opinion that estoppel can never
be resorted to in the case of a void marriage where the illegality of the marriage is
known to the party insisting upon the estoppel and where there is no pretense of
deception upon the part of the other partner to the arrangement. We do not believe
that Courts of equity should even for civil purposes and property rights invoke this
shielding doctrine where neither good faith nor lack of knowledge nor honest belief
in the validity of the marriage, nor a bona fide effort to comply with the laws of the
land and the dictates of morality are present as considerations. We think this is the
doctrine of the case of Johnson v. Johnson, supra, and it is certainly the rule obtaining
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the failure to comply with the statutory formalities, it was evident that they
never completely regarded or treated themselves as married, or even desired
that legal status until one of them died leaving property. The technique,
marriage by estoppel, being in the nature of equitable estoppel, it is not surprising that, where the controversy concerns supposed rights as between the
parties growing out of their relationship, rather than rights of a third party
who has acted in reliance upon the validity of the apparent marriage relationship, the court should inquire into the motives of the parties and the good
faith with which they entered and carried on the arrangement. But the court
in the Rambean case, in deciding that estoppel between the parties to deny
the existence of a marriage should not be raised under the circumstances,
rested its decision on other grounds besides policy considerations, requiring
a stricter compliance with the elements of estoppel as they are found in the
ordinary use of that doctrine. The court stressed the fact that the proof
failed to show any representation, or claimed representation, made by the
deceased upon which the woman petitioning to be declared his widow had
relied to the extent that she believed they were validly married (or that there
was an attempted compliance with the statutory requirements of marriage).7
If the court in the future will require of the party invoking the application
of the doctrine a good faith belief in, and reliance upon, a representation by
the other that the relationship they are entering into is a lawful marriage
as a prerequisite to its application, it is apparent that one relying on Smith
v. Bank as authority for the proposition that a present agreement, without
ceremony, between parties to live together as husband and wife, followed
by cohabitation and holding out as such over a period of years is sufficient
to raise an estoppel between the parties to deny the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage, will be on unfirm ground.76 But estoppel is a slippery
concept which is hard to hold down by a few decisions, and it is not likely
that the Rainbeau case will eliminate its usefulness with respect to informal
marriages. Especially is this not likely where the court feels strongly that
public policy will be better served by treating the parties as married than not.
Before leaving the subject of estoppel, reference should be made to
in other jurisdictions [citing 26 Cyc. 867 (1907)]. . . . There is not any testimony
whatever upon which this woman can urge that she was misled by Horn and honestly
believed that she was married and remained his wife until his death upon the assumption
in good faith that she was lawfully married. The reverse is the truth. Hence the lack
of any basis for an estoppel. The general rule is that no estoppel against a palpably
illegal marriage ever arises either on the part of the parties or of the heirs of either. ...
We are persuaded that it would not be good morals to sanction such an arrangement,
or treat it as the basis for the acquisition of rights by parties inter se. For we are not
dealing with the rights of third parties against the one or the other upon the assumption
that there was a marriage. . . . Moreover, we are of the opinion that she should be
repelled upon the equitable rule that she does not possess clean hands." Horn v. Shelton,
6 Tenn. C.C.A. 530, 532-33, 534, 535 (1916).

75. Is this an indication that section 8414.6 of the Tennessee Code may be given

the broader interpretation? See notes 22-25, supra.
76. See 20 TENN. L. REv. 621 (1948).
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problems it creates. Since estoppel acts on the person, when there is a marriage by estoppel, who is estopped? The parties cannot contest the validity
of their relationship as a marriage between themselves or as against third
parties who have acted in reliance on the apparent regularity of it. But on
the other hand, it is not certain that third parties are in turn precluded from
questioning the validity of it where to uphold it would be to benefit the
7
participants against the third parties.
If the Tennessee court has required that its marriage-by-estoppel device
shall conform more to the general pattern of equitable estoppel in the particulars set forth above, it does not necessarily follow that the courts are
left without a tool in many cases for upholding relationships as valid marriages where it would be desirable to do so. Suppose a case involving an
informal marriage followed by circumstances such as would make the court
want to uphold it because of the general public policy in favor of sustaining
marriage, but in which some of the elements of equitable estoppel are missing.
For example, suppose the parties in the Rambeau case had lived together
for twenty years preceding the man's death; that they had come to regard
and treat each other with love and respect; that during that time they had
acquired the general reputation of being married; that children had been
born to the union; that they had jointly saved and bought and otherwise come
into the ownership of property; that third parties had extended credit to
each of them in reliance on the supposed marriage; and that he died intestate.
There having been in its origin no attempted compliance with the marriage
statutes, nor representation by one party that they were lawfully married
which the other in good faith relied on, the court would have just as hard
a time finding all the elements of true estoppel there as it did in the actual
case. However the court could save this relationship as a marriage by the
use of conclusive presumptions. This device was developed by the Johnson
and Smith cases, which also originated the estoppel doctrine. It has never
been repudiated since that time, and not even the Rambeau case placed any
real restriction on it because the facts were not there appropriate for its
application. In the Rambeau case, the opinion made no specific reference to
the argument that a marriage might be conclusively presumed, though that
argument was in fact made by the petitioner. The language in the Johnson
and Smith cases has not, therefore, been repudiated. It is significant that the
77. Suppose a man and woman, H and W, fail to meet all the statutory requirements for a formal marriage in the beginning, but live together thereafter for twenty
years, all the while regarding and treating each other as husband and wife, with the
attendant love and respect, and holding themselves out as such to the world. On these
facts, the parties would certainly be held to be estoppel to deny the validity of their
relationship between themselves and as against third parties who changed their positions in reliance on it. But suppose further, that a third party struck IV with his
automobile causing her to be permanently disabled. In a suit by H in which he claims
damages for loss of consortium, can the third party question the validity of their
relationship as a marriage?
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parties in the Rambeau case had cohabited for only seven years, whereas the
parties in the other two cases had cohabited for 25 years.
An analogy can be drawn between the use of conclusive presumptions
to uphold the validity of a relationship as a marriage where the parties have
lived together as husband and wife over a long period of time, and have been
holding themselves out and have acquired the general reputation as such
through the years, and the manner in which rights in land were acquired by
prescription at common law. The common law courts made use of a fiction
of lost grant. It was presumed from the adverse user for a period presumptively beyond legal memory, ultimately fixed at twenty years, that the easement had been created in due form between the owner of two parcels by
grant, and that the grant had been lost. In the beginning this was probably
a presumption of fact, the idea being that there actually was a lost grant.
Soon, however, it came to be a conclusive presumption and, thus, a rule of
law; this presumption could not be rebutted even by the most conclusive
proof that no grant had, in fact, been made in the beginning and the juries
were directed so to find in cases where the presumption was known to be
a mere fiction. Significantly, this doctrine of prescription is one which was
developed by the courts themselves, without the assistance of statutes. Prescription was based from the beginning on the same broad principle on which
statutes limiting actions for the recovery of land were based, the settling of
conflicting claims in favor of long continued adverse user and enjoyment
of the incorporeal rights.78 So an annotator of Tennessee cases said, "Independent of the statutes of limitation, and upon commoi law principles and
the general principle of public policy, a grant from the state will be presumed
where there has been a continued and uninterrupted adverse possession and
enjoyment . . . for 20 years, though there be no paper title nor color of
title. . ..,,79 If public policy requires that the property rights in land be

definitely and finally settled by presumption of a lost grant after a long continued claim of right and user in order to cut off further disputes over it,
many times after the death of parties and witnesses, some of which would
probably be fraudulent, it would seem that public policy in the stability of
marital relationships and the home, and legitimacy of children would even
more call for a type of "marriage by prescription" or conclusive presumption.
This technique when applied should have the force and effect to make
the relationship under consideration a valid and subsisting marriage for all
purposes and to all the world, so as not be a half-way measure as marriage
78. See 7 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 345-50 (1926); 2 WALSH,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 595 (1947); WALSH, A HISTORY OF
ANGLO AmERICAN LAW 273 (2d ed. 1932). See also Angus v. Dalton, 4 Q.B. Div.
162 (1878), on the development of the idea that the presumption of a lost grant after
twenty years is irrebuttable.
79. 6 TENN. CODE ANN. p. 28 (Williams 1934). See Tennessee cases there cited.
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by estoppel appears to be--i.e., where the parties may be estopped to question
the validity of their relationships between themselves, and against third parties
who have changed their position in reliance on it, but third parties are not
in turn estopped to raise the question.
CONCLUSION

The result is that the Tennessee courts have the means for upholding
informal marriages whenever the social reasons are sufficiently strong to
impel them to do so. This is a very desirable result, and one which is not
open to the criticism that the courts are inviting or encouraging informal
marriages as against the ceremonial, statutory marriage. These devices are
not alternative means of attaining the marriage status ab initio, but are
merely remedial devices looking backwards, which the courts may use on
occasion when satisfied that it is for the good of the state and society, as
well as for the parties and their children and descendants. Of course, the
application of these devices will continue not to be mechanical, but the courts
will carefully consider the motives of the parties and the character of the
relationship they maintained, both in the inception and in subsequent years,
and weigh in the balance the somewhat conflicting public policies noticed
above, before deciding which result would be more for the overall good.
It may be urged that this remedial scheme is objectionable for lack of
certainty. This is no real objection, however, since certainty is needed primarily for governing conduct, and parties who want to be sure their marriage
will be valid need only to comply with the statutes. The remedies discussed
in this Note are for the purpose of providing a just result in regard to past
events which the parties cannot now change.
ROBERT E. KENDRICK

